Thoughts on Ukraine, Part 9: Impact on World’s Food

Figure Sunflower Oil and Wheat are Two Key Ukrainian Food Exports

One voice missing from the security discussions on Ukraine is food security. The agricultural community certainly understands it, and there is a lot of discussion. But history tells us that hunger is a powerful source of instability and migration. Jared Diamond’s books Guns, Germs, and Steel and Collapse provide some good reading on this topic.

The issue is not just with Ukrainian food production. We also need to factor in the potential impact of production declines in Russia as well. The sanctions could move funding away from the agriculture sector to protect the kleptocrat portfolios and for fuel, replacement munitions and replacement vehicles and weapons lost in Ukraine.

“Some of the main importers from both Russia and Ukraine are:

• Egypt, where a total of $3.02bn worth of wheat was imported in 2019, $1.44bn came from Russia, and $773.4m from Ukraine.
• Ethiopia, where a total of $458,42m worth of wheat was imported in 2019, $142.01m came from Ukraine and $64.77m from Russia.
• Yemen, where a total of $549.89m worth of wheat was imported in 2019, $145.81m came from Russia and $79.8m from Ukraine.
• Lebanon, where a total of $148.49m of wheat was imported in 2020, $119.1m came from Ukraine and $22.93m from Russia.
• Palestine, where a total of $10.98m worth of wheat was imported in 2020, $5.61m came from Israel (mostly via Ukraine and Russia) and $3.57m direct from Russia.”

These countries are some of the most unstable in the world. The second or effects could be even more destabilizing. They potentially include:

• Other countries experiencing food shortages as supplies reallocate their supplies.
• A sharp increase in food costs: not only wheat substitute or near substitute items such as corn and other grains.
• A potential further increase in gas prices if corn is shifted away from ethanol production to food.

Figure Ukraine Wheat Production

The current conflict in the south and east is in some of the most important wheat production areas, as shown in Figure 2. The danger is two-fold. First, these are some areas Russia wants to annex or at least control. Second, the fighting could damage or destroy infrastructure and transportation networks that could disrupt production for several years.

In Part 8, I discussed a holistic Multidomain Operations approach to the Ukraine response. A holistic response needs to add agriculture to the team to assess the potential damage to the world food supply and identify potential replace sources. Replacement sources could be additional wheat production in the US and other producers, and well as providing substitute or near substitute items. Some key questions are:

• What countries at most risk for starvation?
• Will these shortages be enough to trigger famine?
• How will these shortages affect other food stocks and supplies?
• How much can other wheat producing countries ramp up production this year?
• What is the potential for starvation in Russia, and what are the implications?
• Will Ukraine at least be able to feed itself, or will the wheat exporter become a wheat importer? If so, for how long?
• How long will Ukrainian and potentially Russian wheat, sunflower, and other agricultural product be disrupted?

The security analysts then need to take this information to help answer some of these questions:

• Will food shortages trigger more migration and social unrest?
• Where can we expect potential violence and how can we respond?
• What happens if there are food shortages in Russia? Will it trigger riots and other instability there? If so, how will the Russian government respond?

Food shortage is a tremendous humanitarian concern, but it is also a security concern.