Deterrence, Taiwan-Style

 

Capitalizing on the American strategic defeat in Afghanistan, the People’s Republican of China (PRC) through the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) stepped up incursions into Taiwan’s airspace last fall and continuing into 2022. For example, in early October, the PLAAF flew 149 aircraft through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). An ADIZ is well-defined area used by many countries around the world for the purposes of identification, location, and air traffic control of aircraft in the interest of sovereignty, safety, and national security purposes. The flights consisted of a mix of aircraft, including Xian H-6 medium-range strategic bombers, Shenyan J-16 strike fighters, and other miscellaneous aircraft. The graphic below depicts some of those incursions.

[Note: the above graphic can be found at this URL]]

The H-6K bomber variant “carries six electro-optic or infrared imaging guided air-launched cruise missiles capable of precision striking [and incorporates the 1,500 km] CJ-20 air-launched Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) for conventional/nuclear strike.” Thus, all of Taiwan was potentially within CJ-20 missile range during any flights containing H-6K bombers.

With the forced absorption of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) well in hand, the Chinese Communist Party has refocused its sights on the main prize – the avowed reintegration of Taiwan into the PRC. These flight incursions are expressly a warning to any Taiwanese separatists, as this China Daily agitprop article boldly stated on 4 October: “China will take all measure necessary to crush any ‘Taiwan independence’ attempts, Chinese Foreign Ministry said. Military analysts said that the PLA drill on the day is a strong warning to both secessionists and their foreign supporters.” The PRC has ratcheted up tensions in the Taiwan strait, with their wolf warrior diplomats in parallel castigating the US for continued support for Taipei, with Taiwan’s defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng recently stating that tensions with China are at their worst in 40 years.

Is US Support a Sound Basis for Taiwan’s Deterrence of the PRC?

Since 1979, the US has recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China under the “one China policy,” acknowledging that Taiwan is part of China. But while the US maintains formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, it also has maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan (Republic of China). This was codified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which contains these three key points:

• Reaffirms as a commitment of the United States the preservation of human rights of the people of Taiwan.
• Declares that in furtherance of the principle of maintaining peace and stability in the Western Pacific area, the United States shall make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity as determined by the President and the Congress.
• Directs the President to inform the Congress promptly of threats to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan, and any danger to the United States interests arising from such threats. Specifies that the President and the Congress shall determine the appropriate action in response to any such danger.

Every US administration since 1979 has reaffirmed its commitment to this Act. Although garbled by President Biden – “I’ve spoken with Xi about Taiwan. We agree…we’ll abide by the Taiwan agreement” – it is believed that the Biden administration is committed to the Taiwan Relations Act, too. And of course, Biden’s ever-vigilant (and ever-compromised) national security and diplomatic team have loudly “put China on notice” for their continuing “intimidation” of Taiwan, as noted here. The execrable Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, declared, “We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion against Taiwan, and we have an abiding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. That’s why we will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.”

That was an interesting statement from the “Circle Back Queen,” given US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s recent announcement that the US government may invoke the US Defense Production Act in order to pressure the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and other companies in the semiconductor supply chain to disclose customer and other proprietary information about the production of semiconductors “within 45 days.” Careful observers could easily come to the conclusion that this is not exactly a confidence building exercise by Secretary Raimondo, and that US government is seeking to obtain semiconductor information critical to US national defense before the walls come tumbling down and the Chinese Communist Party takes over Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.

Perhaps the aforementioned conveys an element of strategic ambiguity: what would Joe Biden really do if the PRC launched a cross-Strait attack on Taiwan while the world is preoccupied with the Russo-Ukrainian war? Perhaps some positive actions taken by ROC President Tsai Ing-wen could stimulate the development of a backbone behind the words spoken by the Biden administration.

Time for a New Deterrence Strategy

Sunday is Double Ten Day in Taiwan: the 110^th anniversary of the Wuchang uprising in 1911 that triggered the Xinhai Revolution that ended the Qing Dynasty and two millennia of dynastic rule in China. Also referred to as National Day, this would be a great opportunity to announce a comprehensive deterrence strategy aimed squarely at Beijing. And just to make the point more poignant to the CCP, the strategy could be organized according to the three components of the Three Warfares strategy, which was officially “endorsed by the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in 2003.” Turnabout is fair play!

Here are some of the elements in a potential deterrence strategy divided among the Three Warfares with an objective to demoralize and cause doubt in the minds of PRC/PLA decision-makers:

Psychological

• Invite the US to station additional military forces temporarily in Taiwan (and on a rotational basis), as was begun during the Trump administration (reported here); would the PRC be willing to kill Americans in an attack on Taiwan?
• Invite the US to deploy the first overseas detachment of Dark Eagle hypersonic missiles to Taiwan at the earliest possible date; the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) is trailer-mounted (mobile) and has a range of “greater than 2,775 km,” which would put a damper on PLA operational planners and serve US national security interests, as well
• Use the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act and the ongoing PLAAF incursions into the Taiwan ADIZ to renew the request for the F-35 stealth aircraft and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system
• Continue to advertise the deployment of the “Yun Feng” (Cloud Peak) medium-range surface-to-surface missile and future variants/improvements, which was confirmed here

Media

• Conduct a coordinated media campaign with other countries in the region to expose CCP/PLA aggression, including reciprocal media agreements to ensure widespread coverage
• Publicize widely all joint operations with foreign military units: before, during, and after
• Leverage sympathetic media around the world in an integrated campaign to expose PRC intimidation
• Conduct and widely publicize nation-to-nation/leader-to-leader talks with countries in the region; also with European Union countries and the US

Legal

• Build on the Japan-Taiwan security talks to sign a mutual defense treaty. As noted here, Japan is already examining options in the event Taiwan is attacked by the PLA. Other related actions with Japan: expand military contacts and joint operations among all services; facilitate reciprocal port visits of naval ships; consider stationing of JSDF personnel on Taiwan (ideally an F-35B aircraft detachment, including maintenance and logistics support)
• Encourage neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Australia, and Malaysia to create a new security alliance aimed at countering PRC encroachment on territorial waters and other aggressive moves; could include regularly scheduled joint naval and coast guard operations in contested areas
• Invite continued deployment of British, French, and German navies to the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait for freedom of navigation operations in support of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and as a deterrent to PLA-Navy aggression in the region.

Conclusion. With the increasing pressure from the PRC, especially PLAAF incursions into the Taiwan ADIZ, it is past time for the development of a comprehensive deterrent strategy to head off a PLA attack on Taiwan. The above measures as part of a Three Warfares-centric strategy are a starter list to which many more elements can be added.

The end.

Follow AFNN:

Truth Social: @AFNN_USA
Facebook: https://m.facebook.com/afnnusa
Telegram: https://t.me/joinchat/2_-GAzcXmIRjODNh
Twitter: https://twitter.com/AfnnUsa
GETTR: https://gettr.com/user/AFNN_USA
CloutHub: AFNN_USA