As we continue our exploration of the reasons that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay gave the citizens of the various states for approving the new proposed constitution, one of the key questions at the time was, how was what they were now proposing better than the failed Articles of Confederation? A reasonable question given that many of the authors of the new document had participated in writing the old one.
It is helpful to remember that the original Articles were not a document that created a united country, rather it was an agreement for the states to cooperate in the spirit of friendship. It is thus a bit unfair to call it a failure as a governing document given its very limited intent. At the time the Articles were written, it would have been politically impossible for the states to have agreed to anything more substantial. Hamilton, continuing to write as Publius, addresses this in Federalist 7.
The very first problem that the states would face if they failed to unify would be the territory west of the existing states. Under the Articles, all the states had given up claims to these territories under acts passed by the Confederation Congress (the name of the governing body under the Articles). Until the defeat of Great Britain these territories would have been considered “crown lands”.
Now they were undefined and Hamilton points out that, “Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations.”[1] If the Articles were dissolved, and the states were to either go off on their own or to form several confederations, it is likely that these western territories would be a source of conflict. He points to a land dispute between Pennsylvania and Connecticut.
In that dispute both states went to court and a decision was rendered in favor of Pennsylvania. The citizens of Connecticut were not happy but, because they were part of the Articles, a compromise was reached. (This dispute was over the Wyoming valley, current day Scranton and Wilkes Barr and the fighting continued sporadically until 1794.)[2]
The second problem would be that individual states would, by necessity, compete among themselves for commerce. Hamilton was a Federalist from the New York delegation that was largely Anti-Federalist so he uses this example to make his point.
“The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations.
A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage.”
As goods traveled through New York from overseas, that state would tax them in order to serve its needs, but it would be the citizens of the destination states that would wind up paying the taxes, thus transferring wealth to New York. Hamilton points out that this is unsustainable, and incidentally points to the future ability of the Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Another issue would be the apportionment of the existing war debt. Hamilton believes that it would be impossible to come to agreement between the states on how manage this issue and he points out, “the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants.” With the immediate threat at bay, Hamilton expects that collecting a tax to pay off this debt would likely be difficult.
And finally, Hamilton returns to the previous argument that a group of individual states would be venerable to a foreign power. “Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.” (Divide and command)” A divided country, either by states or by any other cause, is more liable to control by foreign adversaries.
In Federalist 8 Hamilton discusses how war between the various states would be worse for the individual states than it would be between Europe’s various countries. European standing armies, while “they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy” do serve the purpose of making war less likely by virtue of making it more costly. Call these armies, along with other European fortifications, as a form of Continental Mutually Assured Destruction.
States without standing armies, which were an anathema to the population because of their experience with the British, and without castle like fortifications, would be more likely to invite invasion. He foresees a division of states into those more and less militant, with a corresponding loss of liberty in those that are more fearful of invasion.
Hamilton acknowledges that standing armies are not prohibited under the proposed constitution, but they would be more likely, and more intrusive, under individual states. He goes on to point out that military action strengthens the power of the executive branch toward the existence of a monarchy because, “It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.” Publius here provides us an insight into why the power to declare war is reserved to the legislative.
Because our founders were students of the ancients, Hamilton draws a distinction between the city states of Greece with their armies, and the individual colonial states. First, he points out that the city states were, effectively, “a nation of soldiers,” whereas, advances in modern military technology require a more professional military. That said, our distance from our potential enemies means a united group of states would not need a large army like those in Europe, and would be unlikely to result in the kind of military rule that Hamilton despises.
Did the founders study ancient Greece? Hamilton points out that, “In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE… Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: ‘Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia.’”
And it is in this model that we see the idea of proportional representation that we currently enjoy.
[1] All quotes can be found here https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493270
[2] https://connecticuthistory.org/the-susquehanna-settlers/
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