Hamilton goes on in Federalist 26 to talk about the reasons why a national military is needed and how the legislature provides a check on this power. We have already discussed this issue in other papers so I will not go into greater detail here except to point out that it was the English Bloodless Revolution that moved the power to raise and maintain an army from the king to parliament by creating a Bill of Rights. This is important to us as we see how Hamilton feels that the same kind of core principles are to be made a part of our new constitution. He says in this paper that, “They (the legislature) are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.” [1] (Emphasis in the original) We see this debate today in the creation of the administrative state. The founder’s intent was not to allow the legislature to give away its authority to appropriate funds as this power of the purse is a key component in that branch’s powers relative to the executive branch.
Hamilton here was talking specifically about the dangers that a large and permanent military would have on the liberty of citizens, but it is worth listening to what he has to say on the role of the legislature in preventing such a take-over without limiting our thinking to just the military. Publius writes that, assuming there was a plot to build a military, or other structure, designed to deprive citizens of their liberty, “Is it probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses?” The election of senators and congressmen on a regular basis was designed to produce turnover sufficient to prevent the descent into totalitarianism.
In Federalist 27 we see that the reason we should trust the new federal government under the proposed constitution is that a significant branch of the legislature, the senate, would not be subject to the whims of democracy, but would rather be chosen by the state legislatures. If you will recall, both Plato and Aristotle had significant doubts about democracy as a governing principle. They both feared the democratic mob, and Aristotle in particular thought that separating powers among groups would keep the tyrannical inclinations of democracy at bay.
Plato believed that democracy would naturally set up a conflict between those with less and those with more. In that scenario both sides would seek protection from the other and the natural result would be the selection a tyrannical leader under the guise of protection. Hamilton and the founders were clearly concerned with this risk, and the new constitution avoids direct elections of senate members.
This upper legislative chamber would be selected, “through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction..” The founders believed that by having the senate chosen by the legislatures of the individual states, the passions of democracy would be removed from that body.
Once again, we can see Hamilton elevating the national government as having authority over the states but making it clear that the authority of the national government is not without limits. “It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.” We see here Hamilton reinforcing the concept of the limited and enumerated powers of the federal government. The legal concept he is referring to is that to list is to exclude. Meaning that if the powers of the federal government are listed, then all other powers are specifically excluded.
In Federalist 28, Hamilton explains that the standing army proposed in the new constitution, could be used to stop insurrections within the states, but that the same army would remain under the control of congress and thus not at all similar to what the colonists had seen under British rule. Much of this has been explored before, but there is one item here that we should delve into a bit further. There is always the possibility of government overstepping bounds and of elected representatives failing to properly represent the people.
The answer to this is, “If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state.” Hamilton is clearly stating that the right to self-defense, against the government, is “paramount”. And that the advantage of a single federal government is that the citizens of the country would be more likely to be successful in defending themselves against that than against the individual states.
To read all of John Parillo’s work on the Federalist Papers, check here.
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Well reported! Touché…….