US Military Generals Leading from the Rear: A Root Cause of Military Stagnation

One of the fundamental problems plaguing today’s U.S. military is the growing trend of general officers leading from the rear, far removed from the dangers of direct combat. This shift away from the front lines has created a leadership gap that could be one of the reasons the United States has not achieved a decisive military victory since World War II. While modern technology allows commanders to oversee operations from a distance, this detachment from the realities of combat may be undermining the effectiveness of military leadership and decision-making. The days of generals leading troops into battle seem to have ended, and this aversion to direct combat has consequences for how wars are fought and won.

A telling statistic is that the last U.S. general officer killed in combat was Major General Keith Ware, who died in Vietnam in 1968 when his helicopter was shot down. Since then, the increasing reliance on technology has allowed generals to remain safely behind the front lines, commanding troops from command centers far from the battlefield. While this may make sense from a safety and logistical standpoint, it creates a dangerous disconnect between leadership and the realities of warfare. Generals who are not physically present on the battlefield may lack firsthand insight into the challenges faced by their troops, leading to decisions that are less informed and, in some cases, less effective.

Moreover, the U.S. military today is a fraction of the size it was during World War II, but it maintains nearly the same number of career generals. During World War II, the U.S. fielded a military force of over 16 million service members, with approximately 1,100 general officers. In contrast, today’s active-duty military numbers just over 1.3 million personnel, but it still supports nearly 900 generals and admirals. This disparity suggests that the modern military is burdened with a disproportionate number of high-ranking officers compared to the size of the force, and many of these generals operate in roles far removed from the battlefield.

The U.S. has not won a war decisively since World War II. The Korean War ended in a stalemate, Vietnam was a disastrous defeat, and while the U.S. achieved success in Gulf War I, it was a short, well-defined military engagement rather than a prolonged war. Gulf War I is often classified as a major battle rather than a true war, given that it lasted only a matter of weeks, with a narrowly defined objective to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Since then, U.S. military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have dragged on for years without achieving clear or lasting victories, despite technological superiority. The absence of generals leading on the ground may contribute to these prolonged conflicts, as leadership from afar often lacks the tactical and situational awareness necessary for swift, decisive action.

This distance between leadership and combat has eroded the warrior ethos that was once a hallmark of the U.S. military. During World War II, generals like George S. Patton, Omar Bradley, and Dwight D. Eisenhower were not just commanders; they were warriors, intimately involved in the planning and execution of military operations. They led from the front, earning the respect of their troops and making battlefield decisions informed by their direct experience. Today’s generals, by contrast, are often perceived as bureaucrats who oversee military operations from afar, detached from the harsh realities of combat. While technology has made this possible, it has also dulled the edge of military leadership.

In conclusion, the modern U.S. military’s aversion to having generals lead from the front has created a leadership culture that may be contributing to the nation’s inability to secure decisive victories in war. While safety and technology have enabled generals to command from the rear, this distance from the battlefield has weakened the connection between leadership and combat effectiveness. To restore the military’s capacity for decisive victory, it may be necessary for general officers to once again embrace the warrior ethos, leading their troops not just in strategy, but in the harsh realities of battle. Only then can the U.S. military reclaim the leadership edge it once held.

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5 thoughts on “US Military Generals Leading from the Rear: A Root Cause of Military Stagnation”

  1. Something I was learned ages ago. You can supervise from an office miles away. But you can only lead from the front in the field. Something that has been lost, not only in the military, also law-enforcement, and industry (see the formally great Boeing Corporation). .

  2. Yup, a far cry from the culture where Pershing in WWI ordered “either take that objective or bring me a casualty list of the entire division” and MacArthur told him “you’ll have to compile that list yourself, because my name will be at the head of it” and then went out to lead his men into battle armed with only a riding crop.

    • Ike and Bradley routinely went to the front. Was it a risky as an infantry platoon leader, no, but they knew they had to see what was going on.

      I don’t know if you recall the Maneuver Control System, the Army’s first generation of digital battlefield command and control Calling it a worthless piece of junk would be giving it a complement. But I remember speaking with my S3, “Sir, you know that scares the hell out of me. Thirty years from now a general, in an office in the Pentagon, will be looking at a computer screen and send a message to a fire team leader to move a man.”

    • Ike was largely seen as a “file clerk” (“The best file clerk I ever had”–MacArthur) because he was always a staff officer never having held a Combat Arms post. (This was something that grated on him to his very end, a feeling that he had never really “paid his dues.”) I’d say his real genius was finding talented subordinates, getting them what they needed to do their jobs and then keeping them all on the same page… well, as much so as you can with two stallions like Patton and Montgomery in the same paddock.

      “Hell, I’m a primadonna, and I admit it. My issue with Monty is he WON’T admit it!”–GSP

      Sorry, WWII history, particularly the forensic psychology of it, is kinda my thing, sir. 🙂 Though having seen the trainwreck academia has become, I’m thinking the better career path once I’m off my “forced extended sabbatical” is to focus on Exhibits & Programs Development in the museum sector rather than try for a lectern on increasingly hostile college campuses. (Twenty-five years ago, my alma mater was well known for its aggressive efforts to recruit veterans onto faculty, perhaps because with multiple military bases nearby it was thought they might be able to “speak their language” better for night-class and GI Bill students–but soon after the founding chancellor left it made a hard turn into Wokester Hell. Like Tom Wolfe said, you can’t go home again…)

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