A Sequel to The Third World War; Focus on China

In 1978 British General Sir John Hackett published “The Third World War.” It was a projection of the imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO for a war in 1985. In the book, that war was won by the grace of last minute changes to the West’s defense – neatly outlined in the book. So, it was a push for specific defense fixes clearly articulated in the form of a novel. It’s time for a sequel “Third World War” with the focus on China.

Very interestingly, at the end of the book the author prophesied that after the “war” the defeated Soviet Empire would collapse. That’s precisely what happened when the Soviet Union lost the Cold War in 1989 and imploded in 1991.

Furthermore, he imagined the European Union would be as De Gaulle hoped – an Atlantic to the Urals unity. How unfortunate that didn’t happen. The West could have embraced Russia so much better in the past 30 years. Russian rulers could have reciprocated and integrated instead of choosing antipathy and aggression. Lost opportunity for better, longer peace.

Regardless, the US, our Pacific Allies, and NATO should be putting together the analysis for a sequel to “The Third World War.”

The “futures” wargaming I participated from 1994 through 2013 didn’t plan specifically for China. Hope that is happening now. If they’re as good as the U.S. Navy War College wargames that developed Plan Orange for the Pacific War in World War II, we’ll be in good shape.

A sequel to The Third World War should include these thoughts:

  • National Strategy. Determine what a victory and peace for 50 years should look like. What is the peaceful end state for China after the war + plus 50 years? Consider how and why things turned out for Germany, Italy, and Japan for 78 years since WW II.
  • Defense Strategy. What is the worst case scenario for nuclear, chemical, biological, cyber, EMP attacks from China? What can be done to mitigate losses? What is necessary for recovery from these attacks?
    • The 1970’s book had a polite, very limited nuclear exchange. Not the all-out attack that both sides had planned. War with China won’t be polite.
    • The inter-service politics need to be suppressed in wargames – where only military functions and their associated capabilities war with one another. Game our functional domains and every resident capability against the enemy. Let the chips fall as they may.
  • Force Structure. Ask the MacNamara question, “How much is enough?” without MacNamara’s faulty analysis and foolish arrogance. How many carriers, subs, air wings, divisions, SOF groups, etc.?
    • Mobilization. After the satellites are space junk, the missiles launched, the bombers shot down, and the ships sunk, what’s next? Two warring continental powers separated by an ocean and damaged, if not devastated, by intercontinental weaponry square off for a long war. Like WW II.
      • Need to plan the mobilization of the industrial base, in fact – the Nation – to a wartime economy.
      • Need to plan the mobilization of a greatly expanded Army, as well as replenishment of aircraft, missiles, satellites, and ships. The issues of dealing with a damaged industrial base with absolutely no technology surge capability are enormous. Likewise, all the manpower issues inherent in reconstitution and expansion of forces are tough and would benefit from 20th Century lessons learned – and modified for the present.
  • How to Fight. What Strategic, Operational, and Tactical concepts of operation produce the victory planned in the National Strategy?
    • Airland Battle 2. Land Warfare needs a How to Fight concept like the U.S. Army’s “Airland Battle” from the 1980s. It means a battle, campaign, and war-winning concept against actual enemy capabilities, doctrine, and leadership.
    • Concepts. Requires the tight fit of a coherent technical concept, operational concept, and organizational concept. Requires continuous wargaming, experimentation, review, and updates.
  • Cyber and AI. While the Russo-Ukraine War provides immediate updates on state-of-the-art warfare, what is needed to get out and stay ahead of China in Cyber and AI capabilities with absolute certainty?
  • Manage Change. DoD is a Byzantine puzzle palace of programs, processes, and procedures. It’s a jobs factory for bureaucrats. The management of change must become lean, as in skeletal. The cycle of change from one Army to another is 10 years in peacetime. Meanwhile, people are policy, so the senior sergeants and officers of 2053 are entering service this summer. What training and education do they need? Is anyone else needed? Why, where, and how?
  • Research and Development. Adults are needed to direct the billions of large, but not unlimited funds, which must be focused on the most serious of “you bet your life” choices among competing technologies. Wasting time and money on all-electric, Green forces is as childish as it is stupid.

So much is needed to create a Victory Plan equal to the work of 44 year old, Army Lt. Colonel Albert C. Wedemeyer’s WW II “Victory Program.”

Even at my age, I’d love to contribute as much as I can to such an effort.

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