There is a lesson in the Afghan man, Rahmanullah Lakanwal, who shot two national guardsman in DC in November of last year, if we are acute enough to see it. This was a man who worked for years with American forces, who was allowed to come here because, presumably, his life was in danger from the new rulers of Afghanistan because of his collaboration with the American enemy. Yet he chose to drive thousands of miles across the country to attack our soldiers. Then there is Ayman Mohamad Ghazali, a 41-year-old Lebanese-born U.S. citizen, who peacefully lived for years in Dearborn Heights, Michigan, and on March 12, 2026 suddenly decided to attack Temple Israel in West Bloomfield with a vehicle and rifle.
What explains this strange behavior?
I believe I know the answer. And that answer lies in the fundamental nature of Islam.
Tribalism and Islam
Islam is not a normal religion in any sense. “Normal” religions dwell in the house of the spirit and typically enter the realm of politics and society only when first principles are threatened.
This is not Islam.
To understand this, we need to look at the society in which Islam arose.
Arabia in the 7th century was intensely tribal. While there were cities such as Mecca and Yathrib – now called Medina – even these were inhabited by tribal groups, not citizens in a modern sense. The dominant tribe in Mecca was the Quraysh, who had driven out the Khuza’a to seize power. Thus one of Muhammad’s biggest problems was that an Arab’s first loyalty was always to the tribe, a loyalty known as ʻaṣabiyyah in Arabic, and he vigorously therefore condemned it. His ultimate solution was not to try and remove it, for he knew that was impossible. Instead, he redirected it and replaced the tribalism of human groups with a tribalism of belief, uniting believers under a universal brotherhood, the ‘Ummah, based on Islamic faith and piety, not blood ties.
But the ‘Ummah is just a displaced tribalism and shows all the characteristics of a tribal society. Let’s consider what these are.
Characteristics of Tribal Societies
Tribal societies have a need to strongly identify with their group and view outsiders as threats, competitors, or inferiors, even over minor differences. This in turn leads to automatic favoritism toward “us” — e.g., giving benefits or leniency to group members — and discrimination, suspicion, or dehumanization of those who are not. In a modern society this means prioritizing hiring, promotions, resources, or opportunities for in-group members. This is not seen as wrong: it is, rather, a virtuous act.
Support for the group’s leaders, narratives, or actions, regardless of evidence or ethics, is unquestioning, while dissent within the group is punished or silenced; individuals must suppress personal judgment to maintain belonging, for conforming to group norms is the only way to avoid ostracism. All must seek out and consume only information that confirms the group’s worldview, while dismissing or attacking opposing sources.
Moral outrage is a major signal of loyalty, for one’s affiliation is much more important than individual actions or arguments, and virtue is proven this way. Arguments from outsiders are simply dismissed: they are not members of the tribe.
Finally, relationships are fraught: Family arguments, ended friendships, or workplace avoidance over tribal markers is the norm. It is thus best to interact only with those you trust, and that includes marriage.
This was the structure within which Muhammad created his religion.
Islam and the State
Let’s first consider differences between Islam and Christianity, for there is a remarkable tendency to see all religions as similar, even when they are not.
One of the foremost differences is that, while both Christianity and Islam address governance and the role of the state, their classical and historical views diverge radically on the relationship between religious authority and political power.
In Christianity, a distinction between the spiritual (the church or kingdom of God) and temporal) realm is clear: Matthew 22:21 says “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s”.
No such stricture exists in Islam. There, a unity of religion and state (dīn wa-ldawla) is enjoined: Islam is both faith and governance. Religious law (Shari’a) should guide all aspects of life, including politics. To Christians, Jesus’ kingdom “is not of this world” (John 18:36); obedience to authorities is God-ordained (Romans 13:1-7), though allegiance to God is the ultimate value. Most importantly, there is no divine blueprint for a specific political system in Christianity.
Every aspect of this is quite different in Islam.Both Qur’an and Ḥadīth – the affirmed utterances of Muhammad and the recounting of his acts — emphasize submission to God in all matters. Muhammad was not just a spiritual leader; he was a political one as well. Sovereignty (ḥakimiyya) does not belong to any state, but to God alone, implemented through Shari’a, the body of Islamic law that God has ordained. Sovereignty without Shariʻa is thus not a valid exercise of God’s will.
In Christianity, the State maintains order, justice, and peace by the temporal sword; the church focuses on spiritual salvation. The State is secular in authority, though influenced by Christian ethics. In Islam, the State enforces Shari’a, promotes virtue, and protects the Muslim community, the ‘Ummah. A valid state, then, can only be a caliphate where the ruler upholds divine law, as manifested when the prophet Muhammad ruled Medina, and in the brief time after his death when the four first Khalifahs or successors ruled between 632 AD and 661 AD. This is regarded in Sunni Islam as an ideal or “golden age” of leadership because the successors followed the Qur’an and the example (the “Sunnah”) of Muhammad closely.
In Christian states, there is thus strong support for church-state separation in many contexts. In Islam, no such separation must exist. The ruler must be a Muslim, and follow God’s commands, manifested in Shari’a.
Muslims in Non-Muslim Society
Classical Sunni jurisprudence (from the four madhhabs or Islamic schools of legal thought, Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi’ī, and Ḥanbalī) view loyalty to a non-Muslim state through doctrines termed al-walā’ wal-barā’ (loyalty to believers and disavowal of disbelief). They divide the world into dāru l-salām or the Land of Peace where Islamic law dominates, and dāru l-ḥarb or Land of War, where non-Islamic societies prevail.
Residing in non-Muslim lands is generally discouraged, or even prohibited if it endangers faith or ability to practice openly; migration to dāru l-salām is obligatory for those able to, if they are unsafe or unable to manifest their Islam. Living in the dāru l-ḥarb risks assimilation into kufr or disbelief. The Classical Sunni view is that ultimate loyalty is reserved for Allah, the Prophet, and believers; it is forbidden to take disbelievers as intimate allies (‘awliyā’) over Muslims (Qur’an 3:28, 5:51), implying approval of kufr or support against the ‘Ummah. No deep political/emotional allegiance to non-Islamic systems or people is permissible.
Most importantly, there is no explicit concept of citizenship; loyalty is framed entirely religiously. Aiding a non-Muslim state against a Muslim state is strictly forbidden; full allegiance can only be to Islamic authority. It is prohibited to fight for or with dāru l-ḥarb against dāru l-salām.
These rulings reflect a worldview where the ideal is Islamic sovereignty, with non-eMuslim lands seen as temporary or hostile abodes. Residing there is often contextual (e.g., trade, or for proselytization, known as daʻwah) not permanent settlement with loyalty.
The Militant Nature of Islam
One of the most important aspects of Islam is that it is fundamentally a religion ordered as a military organization. Conquest and subjugation of non-Muslims is not just suggested: it is enjoined upon believers, and this obligation is termed Jihad. Nor is it just one obligation among many in the religion: it is the primary religious obligation, for the entire world must become Muslim, and those who refuse to convert must be killed, or, if allowed to live – theoretically only acceptable for those who are members of Ahlu l-Kitāb, i.e. Jews and Christians, can only be tolerated as subjugated, taxed outsiders with lesser rights than Muslims. Violence is thus not denigrated. Indeed, it is seen as absolutely required to advance the faith.
Qur’an 9:29: “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture — [fight] until they give the jizya willingly while they are humbled.”
Dealing kindly with non-Muslims depends crucially on whether they are seen as a threat:
Qur’an 60:8: “Allah does not forbid you from dealing kindly and justly with those who do not fight you.”
But if they do oppose Muslims they must be attacked.
Qur’an 8:39 — “And fight them until there is no more fitnah [persecution] and [until] worship is [acknowledged to be] for Allah alone.”
In this the distinction between Hudna (truce) and Sulḥ (peace) is important. Since Muslims are enjoined to fight until victorious, they can never make a true peace with non-Muslims. They can only have temporary truces or peace agreement with them, classically up to 10 years, based on the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyyah, which was a crucial 10-year peace treaty in 628 AD between Muhammad and the Quraysh of Mecca, allowing Muslims to return for the lesser pilgrimage or ‘Umrah the following year. Such a peace is only permissible when Muslims are weak or to gain advantage; it is binding only until abrogated. This is distinguished from permanent peace, sulḥ, which is reserved for Muslim-Muslim relations, or territories which have been subjugated or converted. Classical jurisprudence often framed treaties as temporary in a world divided between Dāru l-Salām (abode of Islam) and Dāru l-ḥarb (abode of war), allowing hudna for regrouping or advantage.
Do not be misled by Qur’anic verses like the following:
Qur’an 2:256 (Sūrah Al-Baqarah)
“There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in ṭāghūt (false deities) and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.”
These verses certainly appear in the Qur’an, but Islamic theology mandates that when verses later in time contradict them, the earlier verses are “abrogated”. Abrogation means that a later Qur’anic verse or ruling cancels, supersedes, or modifies an earlier one. This means that Qur’an 9:29 abrogates Qur’an 2:256 for it dates from a period when Muhammad had taken control of a state and had no need any more to be pacific.
Islamic Priorities
Islam’s doctrine of al-walā’ wal-barā’ (loyalty and disavowal) requires Muslims to prioritize allegiance to Allah, His Prophet, and the global Muslim community (‘Ummah), while showing enmity against anything that opposes Islamic monotheism. This does not entirely prohibit all forms of amity outside the ‘Ummah, but it imposes strict limits, especially on deep emotional, religious, or political allegiance to non-Muslims. Full love, support, and allegiance to fellow believers is enjoined on Muslims for Allah’s sake: but there must be no affection for those opposing Allah or his messenger. (Qur’an 58:22) Indeed, Muslims are required not just to love Allah, but to hate for him:
“Whoever loves for the sake of Allah, hates for the sake of Allah, gives for the sake of Allah, and withholds for the sake of Allah has perfected the faith.”
(Sunan Abi Dawud 4681, graded ṣaḥīḥ or authentic by al-Albani)
These views stem from scriptural interpretations prioritizing monotheism and community cohesion.
Modern apologists for Islam attempt to ameliorate the harsh reality of Jihad by claiming that there is a distinction between the greater jihad (al-jihādu l-akbar: the internal, spiritual struggle against one’s ego, desires, or sinful inclinations) and the lesser jihad (al-jihādu l-asghar: external, often military struggle). However, this distinction is not found in the Qur’an or the six canonical Sunni ḥadith collections, known collectively as the Kutub al-Sittah. Indeed, the earliest known reference to this explicit distinction appears in the 11th-century work Ta’rīkh Baghḍād (The History of Baghdad) by the Islamic scholar al-Khatib al-Baghḍadi (d. 1071 AD). In it, he records a narration attributed to the Prophet Muhammad: Upon returning from a military expedition, the Prophet reportedly said to his companions, “You have returned from the lesser jihād to the greater jihād,” defining the greater as the struggle against one’s passions or desires. This narration is transmitted through a chain involving earlier figures, but al-Khatib and later scholars (e.g., Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani) classify it as weak (ḍaʻif) due to issues in its chain of transmission. Some authorities, including Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 AD), reject it outright as having no authentic basis from the Prophet. The concept only gained prominence in mystical traditions such as the Sufi sects, traditions and later literature, influencing ideas of inner spiritual striving, but it is absent from early classical jurisprudence (fiqh) and authoritative ḥadīth compilations, where jihād almost exclusively referred to military or at least efforts involving violence. While the idea of struggling against the self exists in earlier Islamic thought (e.g., in sayings of early ascetics), the specific hierarchical contrast between “greater” and “lesser” jihād originates no earlier than this 11th-century source. Its current prominence is an attempt to deny the fact that Jihad is a religious obligation to wage war, not to fight a spiritual struggle.
Conclusion
The incidents involving Rahmanullah Lakanwal and Ayman Mohamad Ghazali serve as stark, contemporary illustrations of the enduring dynamics outlined throughout this article. Lakanwal, an Afghan national who once collaborated closely with U.S. forces—including through CIA-backed operations—arrived in America under programs intended to protect allies from Taliban retribution, yet he crossed the country to ambush and kill American National Guard members in the nation’s capital. Ghazali, a long-settled Lebanese-born U.S. citizen living quietly in Michigan, abruptly shifted to a violent act against a synagogue, reportedly triggered by the recent deaths of family members in conflict abroad—yet framed within a broader pattern of perceived religious and communal imperatives. These are not isolated anomalies of mental instability, personal grievance, or mere radicalization outliers. They reflect the persistent pull of Islam’s foundational structure: a worldview that redirects ancient Arabian tribalism into a global religious tribe—the ‘Ummah—where ultimate loyalty transcends national borders, citizenship, or gratitude toward host societies, and vengeance is a tribal duty. In non-Muslim lands (dār al-ḥarb), classical jurisprudence and scriptural priorities foster a conditional presence at best, with deep allegiance reserved only for fellow believers and divine law.
Concepts like al-walā’ wal-barā’ demand disavowal of disbelief and enmity toward what opposes Islam, while jihad—far from a primarily spiritual struggle—remains, in its classical and scriptural core, an obligation to expand or defend the faith, including through force when conditions allow. The notion of a “greater jihad” as inner struggle, so often invoked to soften perceptions, lacks roots in the Qur’an or authentic ḥadith collections; its elevation is a later, largely Sufi-influenced development dismissed by many traditional authorities.
Similarly, verses promoting kindness or no compulsion in religion are overwritten by abrogation in the Prophet’s later state-building phase, where military dominance and submission to Shari’a became central. In an era of mass migration, resettlement programs, and global connectivity, these doctrines do not inevitably produce violence in every Muslim individual—many live peacefully and integrate meaningfully. Yet they create an ideological framework that can activate suddenly, as seen here, when triggers align: perceived betrayal, communal trauma, or calls to defend the ‘Ummah against real or symbolic enemies. The result is a latent risk that polite multiculturalism often downplays or attributes to “extremism” divorced from theology.
The lesson, then, is sobering: Western societies must confront Islam not as “just another faith” interchangeable with others, but as a comprehensively different system historically and doctrinally fused with governance, loyalty, and conquest. Ignoring this fusion—treating attacks as aberrations rather than manifestations of core tensions—invites repetition. Security demands rigorous vetting, limits on migration from high-risk contexts, and unapologetic insistence on full national allegiance over supranational religious solidarity. Above all, honest discourse about these teachings, free from accusations of bigotry, is essential. Failure to heed the tribal-redirection at Islam’s heart risks more betrayals from within, even from those once aided or welcomed. The alternative is not fear, but clarity—and the resolve to preserve societies built on individual rights, secular governance, and reciprocal citizenship rather than imported tribal absolutes.
ADDENDUM
A ten-dollar bill is in the center of the crossroads. To the north, there’s Santa Claus. To the west, the Tooth Fairy. To the east, a radical Muslim. To the south, a moderate Muslim. Who reaches the ten-dollar bill first? Answer: The radical Muslim. All the others are mythical creatures. — Mark Steyn
—Anthony Tye Rodrigues, Anthony.tye.rodrigues@gmail.com , 03/19/2026
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The answer is: only if you’re a Muslim, and the right type of Muslim.