Surprising many a vaunted military analyst, Ukraine’s military, backed up by civilian volunteers has so far been able to prevent a Russian takeover of the country and forced regime change. All of the so-called experts had predicted a short, violent Soviet style assault, based on mass and maneuver that would have Kiev capitulating within 3-5 days. That was on February 24th. Now here we are on April 6th, and not only have the Russians not taken the Ukrainian capital, but they appear to be withdrawing. Of course the Russian spin on this turn of events doesn’t put it quite that way; but that’s another story.
The story here, is that Ukraine has a chance to transition to the offensive, as opposed to disrupt, delay and defend tactics. Over at Red State, my good friend and fellow Infantryman Bill Crews, AKA “Streiff” has a great piece out regarding a helicopter attack on a Russian fuel depot 20 miles inside Russian territory. His analysis while in depth, posits some interesting ideas without veering off into “19-dimensional chess” territory.
Read: Ukraine Attacks Fuel Depot Miles Inside of Russia—or Did It?
For more information on the war in Ukraine, go to Streiff’s author page, which should be your go-to for the latest and best analysis.
While Streiff’s piece focused mainly on the information battle between Ukraine, Russia and the chattering class in the U.S. media, today we’ll focus on what’s next and when. From the minute the first Russian tanks crossed the border, the 4th estate, enabled by the aforementioned “analysts,” reminded me of a standard, contested American divorce. “How so, Ford?” you might ask. Actually it’s pretty simple. In your typical American divorce, all parties understand that any negotiation will be not about whether or not the husband will pay through the nose. The process will be all about how little of his wealth and future income he will be allowed to retain. This is even understood by the hapless husband who comes home to be confronted with, “I’m just not happy,” shortly followed by, “You’ve been served.”
At first blush, and in most conversations, the chattering class and military analysts have followed that playbook. To begin with, most of them (and I must admit, even myself, initially) opined that things would be over in 3 days. Russian troops would be occupying Kiev and President Zelenskyy would be on the first thing smoking out of Boryspil Airport. Volodymyr Zelensky wasn’t abut to play the role of the hapless husband. Turns out, when U.S diplomats offered President Zelenskyy transportation out of Kiev, he reportedly responded, “I don’t need a ride; I need ammunition.”
That was the better part of two months ago, when the Russians still appeared unstoppable. Since then, things have changed. Instead of capturing the Ukrainian capital, the Russian Army has retreated almost 70 miles—or per the Russian General Staff, “withdrawn to refit and rearm after having met all operational objectives.” That doesn’t mean the Ukrainians are out of the woods; but things are now very different and as time goes on, the relative combat power between them and the Russians is changing.
The Russian logistical situation, not all that great at the beginning, has all but collapsed. Moreover, a much bigger problem is now in play. The Russian Military drafts its troops for a 1-year enlistment, twice each year. The April 2021 “class” is scheduled be be going home this month. This puts Putin in a precarious position. If he allows them to do so, then he loses the most experienced soldiers in his army. If these soldiers are allowed to go home, Putin’s army will then consist of those with 6 months experience (50 % at best) and those with no experience (the remaining 50%). His alternative, is to use the Russian version of an executive order to extend their enlistments. He can do that, but the consequences for civil order when Private Ivan fails to show up on time at his Mamushka’s house in Moskva, could incite more public unrest than is already occurring. It could even result in the no-show of a goodly proportion of the next class of conscripts.
When we discuss combat power at an operational level, we discuss numbers (tanks, planes, cannon, missiles) and quality (training, equipment reliability). At this stage of the game, the Russian forces tasked for the Ukraine mission have been declining in both areas. They have been losing equipment and people, and neither of those are being replaced at the same quantitative or qualitative levels.
The Ukrainian forces on the other hand, are moving in the opposite direction. Although they started out at a vast numerical advantage and have taken casualties, their qualitative advantage, especially in their ability to conduct operational, maneuver warfare. When you see maps of the areas “controlled” by the Russians produced by the chattering class, you are looking at a lie. The entire Russian advance is almost entirely road bound while the Ukrainians are free to move and attack Russians from their flanks—and it’s working. My friend Streiff and I have had extensive conversations abut how being road bound is putting the Russians in a bad tactical place.
The Ukrainians are starting to build a quantitative advantage to boot. They have essentially mobilized the entire population, including a few babushkas (grandmothers) who have no problems with telling Russian Soldiers what they think of them. At first blush, we could consider a bunch of civilians with small arms, even less effective than Russian conscripts. However, Russian conscripts, just when they have gotten as “good” as they are ever going to get, get sent home, or if reports are to be believed, desert.
Ukrainian civilians aren’t going anywhere. The ones who survive, are gaining in combat experience. If they haven’t by now, the Ukrainian forces, bolstered by its citizen volunteers, will not only outnumber the Russians sent against them, but will also have much more experience in the brutal art of close quarters combat. That is where we are at this point. What happens next and what are Zelenskyy’s options? Stay tuned
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Not sure Biden wants Putin to win, in the conventional sense.
Joe lives in fear of him.
Bill taught me a lesson about Soviet era weaponry, in one of his articles, a couple years ago, and it appears that nothing has really changed since then. I had not considered the conscript army’s weakness, but you set that straight. Put the two together, and Russia doesn’t have the military they have been puffing their chests out about.
You hear a lot about that orgasmic fifth generation fighter, the SU-57, which they may have one or two, from the US media and Youtube experts, and thee ground infantry support vehicles, that have all those fantastic Chinese made tires that seem to go flat after a few miles inside Ukraine.
What I wonder is when China turns against Russia, and Putin gets his proverbial bullet in the back of the head in the basement of that famous prison behind the Kremlin?
China wants something Russia has a bunch of, and Russia is signaling to China, inadvertantly, that it is a big lie. If this is the extnt of Russia’s military, China may just end up owning Gazprom.