The Ghost of Nikita Khrushchev Haunts Vladimir Putin

The Ghost of Nikita Khrushchev Haunts Vladimir Putin to such an extent that if Vlad looks over his shoulder he sees Nikita. 

On 13 October 1964, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) ousted First Secretary Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev from power in a soft coup. In an “emergency meeting” in the Kremlin, it was “suggested” to Khrushchev that he resign his positions as First Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Central Committee and the Presidium accepted Khrushchev’s “voluntary request” the next day, and an end was put to his “erratic behavior” and secretiveness as the leader of the Soviet Union.

In recent months, Russian President Vladimir Putin has also been accused by foreigners of “erratic behavior.” From The Hill, “Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Russian President Vladimir Putin “seems erratic,” adding he has an “ever-deepening, delusional rendering of history.” Her opinion is increasingly shared by others in the US political class, including Democrats. James Clapper, Barack Obama’s Director of National Intelligence, has also referred to Putin as “unhinged,” as reported by Fox News back in February.

Is that the new narrative? That supposed “erratic behavior” warrants regime change? Is the increasing use of that phrase a possible harbinger of what might happen in Putin’s future? Is the ghost of Nikita Khrushchev beginning to haunt Vladimir Putin? Let us compare and contrast.

Khrushchev was a mercurial change agent in the Soviet Union for a decade that began when he became First Secretary in 1953. He was the major transitional leader responsible for “de-Stalinization” of the Soviet Union: “the process … of first discrediting Stalin and then reforming Soviet Russia leading to large numbers being released from imprisonment in Gulags, a temporary thaw in the Cold War, a slight relaxation in censorship and an increase in consumer goods,” as further described by ThoughtCo here. Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” that signaled the start of de-Stalinization was given at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU on 25 February 1956, entitled “On the Personality Cult and its Consequences.” Ironically, before he was ousted, Khrushchev developed his own personality cult through antics such as allegedly banging his shoe during a UN General Assembly session in 1960 in protest of a speech being given by the Filipino representative who accused the Soviets of using a double standard in proposing a Russian resolution condemning “colonialism.” Others considered that incident as proof that he was an erratic hothead and a buffoon.

Some of Khrushchev’s important – and frequently controversial – policies and programs are listed below:

• Blaming Stalin for “exceeding the authority of the CPSU” through the Great Terror that included purges, NKVD tribunals (troikas), concentration camps, and executions (as if Stalin was solely guilty!)
• Ending the NKVD (later KGB) troikas
• Publicizing the proceedings of key Central Committee meetings for the first time
• Crushing the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
• Implementing a series of agricultural reforms, including retaining some ideas of crackpot agronomist Trofim Lysenko, that did little to improve Soviet agricultural output
• Loosening some Stalin-era political constraints on artists, musicians, authors, and others (albeit unevenly and always from a Leninist perspective)
• Closing churches, monasteries, convents, and synagogues in a multi-year “anti-religious campaign”
• Implementing major educational reforms (generally considered successful)
• Promoting the theory of “peaceful coexistence” to lessen nuclear tensions during the Cold War (Khrushchev considered the Cold War to have been a “mistake”)
• Installing medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war (one of his major objectives was the removal of American nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles from Turkey)

When Vladimir Putin rose from KGB obscurity to become president of the Russian Federation in 2000, his country was in debt, the Russian government was corrupt, and Russian military capabilities were in decay. He campaigned as a change agent against corruption and to transform the faltering Russian economy into market economy “with Russian bureaucratic characteristics.” He implemented political and economic reforms and launched legal actions against “corrupt” oligarchs, media personalities, and leading public figures. Through political manipulations while serving subsequently as premier and president, as well as the improvements in the economy that average Russians could see, he was able to retain power through a series of elections as the key Russian leader through the present. He has frequently addressed intentions to consolidate ethnic Russians into the Russian Federation while silencing (and persecuting) domestic critics and railing against NATO and EU expansion in Eastern Europe.

Putin has used the revenues from a growing economy and expanding oil and gas revenues to modernize the Russian military to a degree (although the results in Ukraine so far could not have met his expectations). He assiduously developed his own cult of personality through staged public appearances, including playing ice hockey with a crony and riding horses and chopping wood while bare-chested. His foreign ventures have included the Syrian intervention, suppressing “terrorism” in Chechnya, and meddling in Belarus, Georgia, and, most prominently, Ukraine. A first Russo-Ukrainian war was fought in 2014 that resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea.

On 24 February, after weeks of force buildup on the Ukrainian border, Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s stated goals have been consistent over the ensuing months and have not deviated, as originally reported by Politico here: (1) the disarmament of Ukraine, (2) neutrality of Ukraine with no NATO membership, and (3) formal recognition of Crimea as part of Russia. Putin is as concerned about NATO missiles close to Russia’s borders as Khrushchev was about those Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Many observers also believe that an unstated Putin goal is the installment of a pro-Russian central government in Kyiv.

Sanctions have subsequently been implemented against Russian interests by the US, EU, and other countries, including freezing of Russian overseas assets, banning Russian aircraft from EU airspace, personal sanctions on Putin and key supporters in his inner circle, and financial restrictions on the Russian Central Bank and other Russian banks. Even neutral Switzerland and Sweden have joined in. Russian businessmen and civilians throughout Europe are considered persona non grata, and the children of sanctioned Russian oligarchs have been detained, as well. Russian domestic support for the invasion of Ukraine is reportedly tepid at best, with significant anti-war protests being held in Moscow and other cities and thousands detained back, as noted here. As the invasion continues, military equipment and other material support is being provided to Ukraine from the EU, UK, and US (the billions of dollars provided to date are graphically depicted here).

The longer the outcome of the war remains in doubt, the stronger Ukraine’s position becomes while Russia is concurrently weakened, both geopolitically and internally in Russia through rising dissent. The unresolved dilemma for the world remains Russia’s large inventory of nuclear warheads and Putin’s recent threats to use them, as Fox News reported here on 21 September.

Domestic issues were a real root cause of Khrushchev’s demise. The Central Committee was generally supportive of his foreign policy decisions, but the foot shortages brought about by his signature agricultural policies (blamed on “droughts”) led to considerable unrest, and he made a convenient scapegoat for the CPSU’s Presidium. He was also an arbitrary decision-maker who was supported by a small group of cronies – much like Putin although of a different sort. Khrushchev’s main support was from hardened communists while Putin’s cronies include oligarchs such as Gennady Timchenko (a major shareholder in Bank Rossiya), Boris Rotenberg (co-owner of SMP bank and SGM, the largest company dedicated to building gas pipelines and electrical power supply lines in Russia), and Igor Rotenberg (majority owner of the Russian oil and gas drilling company Gazprom Burenie). Along with Putin himself, all three have received personal sanctions that were added to long-standing sanctions from the UK and European Union, according to The National News (UK).

Will domestic concerns result in Putin’s demise? The crippling sanctions will have some impact on the Russian economy and could lead to a lower standard of living for most Russians, but the Russians seem to be weathering them for the time being. The Russian ruble’s value fell 30% in by March, but it has since rebounded and stabilized higher than it was before the Ukraine invasion, as graphically depicted here. And Russians are of course concerned about their sons, nephews, and grandsons who are fighting in Ukraine, not wanting a repeat of the body bags that returned from Afghanistan.

Putin’s cronies are sustaining losses, too. BP announced that it was withdrawing its 20% stake in the Russian oil giant Rosneft, which Reuters states could amount to as much as US$25 billion. The Russian assets held in overseas banks have been frozen. The value of their portfolios has plummeted. At what point will their support for Putin begin to crack since the war continues to drag on with no victory in sight? Did they have any idea beforehand of the personal consequences that would accrue with the invasion of Ukraine? Do they detect any “erratic behavior” in Putin’s utterances and actions? Will the US$630 billion in bankrolled foreign currency reserves be enough to pull Putin through? Not if they are frozen.

Conclusion. Popular dissent. A potential crumbling of support from his inner circle. Erratic behavior. These led to the ousting of Nikita Khrushchev from power in 1964. Could Vladimir Putin be facing the same fate for similar reasons in 2022? It’s possible. The ghost of Nikita Khrushchev may be nodding his head in Putin’s nightmares these days.

The end

If you enjoyed this article, then please REPOST or SHARE with others; encourage them to follow AFNN

Truth Social: @AFNN_USA
Facebook: https://m.facebook.com/afnnusa
Telegram: https://t.me/joinchat/2_-GAzcXmIRjODNh
Twitter: https://twitter.com/AfnnUsa
GETTR: https://gettr.com/user/AFNN_USA
Parler: https://parler.com/AFNNUSA
CloutHub: @AFNN_USA