Sometimes Life Deals You A hand You Need To Fold In Order To Live To Fight Another Day
Part 1 and Part 2 provided the details of how it came to be that Joe Kent resigned from the Director position of the NCTC and sent a grandstanding letter to President Trump, bypassing his boss-DNI Gabbard, while outing himself as an Israel conspiracy theorist.
The other positively disqualifying viewpoint Kent has expressed of late is another leftist talking point about Vice President Cheney and others getting wealthy from the Iraq war. Insinuating the decision to invade was tainted by those who stood to gain money profiting through the Iraq effort to oust Sadham Hussein. Which is an interesting opinion, but where is the evidence?
Thinking out loud is wonderful, but where does that end? Maybe I’m naïve, but if there was even a scintilla of evidence that such was the case with the involvement of Haliburton and VP Cheney, the democrats would have gone after Cheney and the Bush administration with everything they had. Hell, they did that for all other matters throughout the Bush presidency, even though they voted for the Iraq effort.
When you include the Cheney belief along with the Israel insinuations to include the Iraq, Iran, and Charlie Kirk “data points,” as well as some of the previously contentious right wing affiliations that surfaced during his congressional campaigns, it is very surprising that Kent was brought in and nominated to be the NCTC Director in the first place.
That tells me he did not go through a polygraph to attain his position, which should be mandatory for the NCTC Director position because of the access exposure to plans, programs and capabilities: it is certainly a best practice (requiring a polygraph.)
This whole episode smacks of the launching of a media-a Pod cast or a social media career. He wouldn’t be the first-he has a great story to tell based on his military career-but I’m not sure the public is going to benefit from what amounts to a 10-month government civil service career that is thrown away for what appears to be personal political reasons and short-term career aspirations.
It’s unfortunate that there is no good outcome here. If Kent is right-and one hopes he isn’t-it basically indicts the entire administration from President Trump on down and would be a glorious victory for the left. A fact that would impact the mid-terms and lead to Trump’s impeachment.
If he is wrong-if he has leaked as is alleged and is guilty of listening to the wrong people and letting some deep seated personal bias cloud his judgement-that he hid from his bosses to get the job in the first place-and there is evidence of that based on his remarks about former Vice President Cheney, Haliburton and profit motives for the Iraq War-then it is best he go away quietly and not force the government’s hand to take potential criminal action against him.
One thing is certain-he is not helping things by going on a seeming non-stop, broad-based self-promotion tour where the detail seems to get better the more he speaks, while the facts are not being added to at all. It is always suspicious in the business when a story gets better with the telling, whereas most stories maintain their character in the telling. He is painting a picture of a guy who should never have been “coddled”-shepherded-into a position of trust, mainly because of his beliefs and judgement.
This is where a polygraph can help sort out people who are seemingly qualified, but whose judgement and beliefs do not square with the potential position. I mean specifically his Israel beliefs, naiveite on Iran based on propaganda-the Fatwa and self-imposed faux missile limitations, the Kirk assassination: all data points.
I wonder if he has been offered a polygraph to address any potential question of leaks? Was he given a polygraph prior to taking his position? Most of us would have been required to do so, particularly relative newbies (to the IC).
Just to clean up some of the process related side of the house, when the government gets any information whatsoever that a person who has been granted a clearance-at any level-has potentially compromised classified information agreements that were signed-agreed to-to get access to such information in the first place, there is an immediate, automatic remedy and process undertaken to resolve the issue.
For those who have never worked for the government or a contractor doing business with the government in a job that requires clearance-access-to classified information, it is a pretty cut and dry affair that tens of millions of people have trod before you.
The government conducts a background investigation to grant a clearance-unless you are an elected official like congress or other special circumstances-consisting of a local and federal records check called a background investigation based upon a National Agency Check (BI NAC) that can be accomplished on a priority basis in a month to 90 days. Or a more intensive effort intended to approve the applicant for a higher clearance level through a more rigorous process.
A Special Background Investigation (SBI) for access to the highest level security clearance-top secret-with Special Compartmented Information (SCI) access-involves the submission of a Security Form 398 (SF398,) which is somewhat of a daunting effort wherein the applicant lists their entire history, who they are, parents, siblings, social security number, dwellings, occupations, neighbors, friends/acquaintances, references, etc.
The process takes a minimum of six months under ordinary circumstances, starting with a security interview by a government counterintelligence officer. Since this is a government function it is not unusual for there to be a backlog that can take up to and over a year.
The person by this time has most often been hired under probationary conditions and can sit in an administrative capacity twiddling thumbs for the entire period: but government and contract firms alike have different policies that apply.
When I retired from the Army to an Army Civil Servant position, my TS/SCI clearance transitioned with me since it was the same basic government department (of the Army.) When I left and became a contractor, my clearance wasn’t an issue since my new job required only a secret clearance based on a NAC, although I worked on higher level classified projects based upon my background.
When I transferred to a different contractor back east, I was in the security bullpen twiddling my thumbs for a month or so because although my TS/SCI was current (the clearance and access is updated every 5 years,) my new employer had contracts with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that I was bid to work on that required TS/SCI based on a current SBI with current polygraph.
Although I had taken several, having worked on many compartments in the past, the NRO rule stated a fresh one must be done for their TS/SCI contracting compartment at first access to their system, which was still in effect at the time. It’s a bit of a long story-it was not actually my first access, but all previous work was as a military or government employee…
Which is all just detail but the bottom-line to all this is that a person who goes through the process signs an agreement that basically waives any and all rights to privacy in exchange for gaining access to classified information. Including access to computers, organizational-corporate-email services, government email (GMAIL) and any employment related activity involving any communications means: TS/SCI internet-(JWICS) and email communications (GMAIL and sensitive but unclassified/For Official Use Only networks-SBU and FOUO), secret internet protocol (SIPRNET) access and the so-called “red lines” associated with classified telephone communications.
At the mere suggestion, suspicion, or knowledge of an incident that insinuates a transgression or violation of the aforementioned agreement signed in order to gain access, an individual is typically-routinely-suspended from access and investigated to ascertain what happened-to get to the bottom of the incident-to disposition whether the individual should be cleared of any culpability in the matter and be returned to service with access restored, or conversely-permanently suspended from any and all accesses and processed for determination of retention.
Which is good background information to get back to the point of the matter that Joe Kent had purportedly been the subject of a leak investigation some months ago that reportedly resulted in him losing access to any and all deliberations involving the planning and particularly the execution of the Iran effort. Somewhat a critical and inconvenient time for the head of NCTC to be in what would be considered a bit of a “pickle.”
That’s somewhat the top headline, but if he was in fact the subject of a leak investigation as has been widely reported, he would be placed in the proverbial security penalty box with suspended access that would prevent him from doing his job-as leader of the NCTC-which would have likely placed him in an administrative capacity with no access to the facility where he would otherwise be working.
The remedy in these cases-particularly for those who have access conditioned on a successful polygraph-and I should have mentioned earlier-there are generally three types for intelligence personnel, there is the somewhat light and background focused-SBI confirmation-background poly, and then there is the daunting and intrusive so-called “lifestyles poly.”
I consider there to be a third form of poly because much like the waiver of privacy that goes with access to classified in the first place, being granted a TS/SCI based upon an SBI with poly comes with the provision that the government can-at any time and without notice-administer a polygraph, “because.”
When all the Washington DC swamp leaks were taking place in the newspapers about satellite programs in the 2006-2009 timeframe, a number of us were “tapped” to update our polys on several occasions to ensure cover for what I believe was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) or the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or CIA leaking that was going on: nobody was ever charged in these matters, although the SSCI Security Manager would later be indicted for leaks.
So Kent was likely in the cooler about potential leaks and the remedy-the likely solution to resolving the issue should the preliminary investigation indicate there was sufficient evidence or sufficient ambiguity to warrant it-was to administer an updated poly to clarify the issue one way or the other.
I also want to forthrightly tell you-I have no inside information about this incident, nor any special knowledge that I’m insinuating here: I have no donut to hide. I’m just explaining how the process normally works based on several dozen years of experience in the business since about 1990 or so, having been through a number of these incidents as a supervisor and several as somewhat of a suspect.
A supervisor doesn’t always get closure on these events. In more than one instance our security manager closed out the employee’s records and we closed out the personnel files and never saw them again and had to rely on the “grapevine” to find out what happened, most of which involved financial and drug problems (every cleared employee is also subject to random drug testing, a no notice policy that usually comes out the morning of the test to supervisors or business unit leads who will witness and certify the legitimacy of the sample.)
Actually, it’s been longer than that for me. In 1977 a radio-a VRC-46 FM Army tactical radio-went missing from our communications shop and several of us were given a polygraph by the post Counterintelligence Unit-by a Warrant Officer who I just by chance was on the Fort Carson Tennis Team with (such a small world, six degrees.) We never heard much back on that issue, although our supervisor-a Staff Seargent (31E communications Chief)-was transferred shortly thereafter: to somewhere. It is not unusual for units to “hep” other units going through Inspector General inspections to help make up for lost, missing, or loaned equipment: but that did not appear to be the case.
I digress but in hindsight I’ve been involved in over 20 of these incidents over the years, ranging from the above commo incident to security compromises in tactical units, to Uniform Code of Military Justice proceedings, to Article 32 investigations about things like violations of the Army “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy and a number of civilian security clearance issues.
All to say that while I lack specific information about Joe Kent’s situation, I do have knowledge of the process and if I was a betting man, I suspect that Kent accepted the benevolence of the government in allowing him to go away-assuming he would do so with grace and civility, without being mad-rather than forcing him to take a poly or resign.
And from all appearances based upon his actions since he was allowed to resign, he chose a different course of action that reveals a lot about him, none of it good.
He was likely offered resignation in lieu of a poly to get to the bottom of the alleged leak investigation or he read the writing on the wall and made a choice. This AFNN article rightly points out that Kent did not work for President Trump, which makes his somewhat theatrical resignation letter to the President all the more questionable in regard to his judgement and also embarrassing.
He did not need to go somewhat “high order” on the matter and could have just shuffled back to where he came from.
I’m not a big fan of the drama and leaking stuff, but I never really had an occasion to do so, nor found myself in a scheme or a Hollywood type government drama that would warrant it-but I really simply never gave it a thought.
What Kent has apparently set himself up for-in the face of likely government benevolence to let him slide off the hook and avoid responsibility for his actions should the allegations of leaks prove true-is for somewhat of a tit-for-tat where the government will feel justified in making public the results of any formal looks or investigations into the allegations.
He has almost forced the government’s hand on the matter, particularly if he was offered resignation in lieu of poly. It’s not an admission of guilt, but it is somewhat insinuating.
I personally would never resign in such a situation unless there was something to the allegation and I feared the results of a poly: it’s the principle of the matter. Having taken a dozen or more polys in my professional life, there is nothing to fear from them unless you have something to hide. And they are pretty good at ferreting out the truth in the hands of qualified operators.
At my 6th or so poly in 2004 the same ex-Army Warrant who had administered the previous several finished the poly and asked typical follow-up questions. One of them he was surprised over, a straight-forward question about “whether you consider yourself an honest person.” He noted that I had a bit of a deep inhale and a waiver in the needle with my answer.
I explained that as a billion-dollar program manager, our agency had some leaders scheming to steal the money that came from the Air Force (USAF) in order to build aspects of the program. “They” wanted to divert and spend the money on agency projects deemed “higher priorities” that already had funding, but it was being tinkled away on malfeasance and other stuff without delivering anything.
They were so inept they could not deliver the program they promised with the money they said they needed, which they received. Like operation blackhole or tinkling on a flat rock…
The USAF had recently accused me personally of being involved in the scheme to siphon off the funds. I wasn’t, but it was a concern to me that I was defending people who I did believe and know were trying to steal the money: that the USAF was right. He laughed and said, “I’m not sure you have the right demeanor and attitude to be a program manager in the government, as those battles never end.” We both laughed about it.
It wasn’t eight months later that those serpents were successful, convincing our director to “abandon ship” on the project-which was subsequently canceled by congress-with the director agreeing to a scheme to allocate the remaining dollars and giving them to those tinkling away the other money on nothing-without so much as a discussion with me, since he apparently knew I would not support such a thing.
And-of course-the money subsequently delivered nothing and went down the same blackhole as the other funds. You may be sitting there like big whoop, but it was a pretty good chunk of money, a total of 46 million dollars a year for the next five years: FYDP funding of ~230 million dollars.
Just consider that in this case our director “bought” an argument that since our mainline acquisition folks were working on the future architecture that would support the to-be-built system, then those dollars should go to help pay for that capability. Of course, the somewhat problematic part of that scheme is the money we received in the early years was concept development, engineering risk reduction and demonstration funding to develop the concept of operation and design for the to-be architecture.
How could somebody be engineering something for a problem we had not solved and a solution that was not described, yet? Government, can’t live with it, can’t live without it.
Reagan’s saying comes to mind, “We’re from the government and we’re here to help.” The rejoinder to which is “We’re glad to see you.” Although my rejoinder is, “Let me help you out: how did you get in here?”
The big deal, bottom-line with the entire Joe Kent affair has little to nothing to do with whether he did or didn’t leak-although 99% of the time leaking becomes a formal investigation that must be looked into with all the attendant isolation from classified information and access I referenced above. Kent has since said publicly that he has not been notified about an investigation: that seems very strange.
But whatever the truth may be given his letter and his comments about Iran and particularly his inflammatory accusations against Israel, he has emerged as a pawn being used in the larger coterie of the faux MAGA element movement of personalities who are looking to hijack the movement in order to go forward with the momentum that comes with Trump, but without Trump.
Max Dribbler
12 March 2026
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