Any Updates? Nope: You Can’t Roller Skate In A Buffalo Herd.
In part 1 introduced the idea of reforming the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Intelligence Community (IC) and provided a top-level plan. Part 2 was a review of world and US events over the years that led to an event that greatly influenced the later ODNI establishment (not for the better.)
Part 3 detailed that event-a 1995 CIA Ballistic Missile National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and a subsequent battle over the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) nominee. Part 4 covered tumultuous events (impeachment, 2000 election, 9-11) that further stratified the political landscape, introducing disarray in the process to stand up the ODNI.
Part 5 discussed why the ODNI establishment did not answer the mail for the overarching goal of the effort: unification of the IC.
I did a lot of pruning, soil disturbing, general beating around the bush in part 5, but the bottom-line up front problem with the ODNI is-was-and will be, politics.
Despite the dire necessity and in spite of my outline of a plan to go about the task, I’m not optimistic about the potential for substantive changes and improvements to the ODNI and the IC. The main reason for my pessimism is the iconic Roger Miller song, “You Can’t Roller Skate in a Buffalo Herd.”
DNI Tulsi Gabbard was confirmed on 12 February 2025. Aaron Lukas was nominated in mid-March 2025 to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI.) Lukas’ experience is mostly State Department related, from the piece: “Lukas brings over two decades of national security and foreign policy experience, including extensive work in diplomacy, intelligence, and strategic policy. A career Foreign Service Officer, Lukas has been with the U.S. Department of State for over 21 years, holding various senior diplomatic and national security roles.”
While the above is all la di da and wonderful, I’m reminded of the blather that was written about the previous glass and gender breaking DNI leadership team (Avril Haines and Stacy Dixon) that I pointed out in an article from May 2021 that has since timed off our AFNN site. From the article:
“Consider that the typical ODNI leader had nearly four decades of combined military, IC or professional scientific or technical experience at the highest levels of our govt upon appointment. While the PDDNI averaged over thirty years or about the same (background-wise.)
The best or top-notch one percent military officers with two decades of experience are just making their first star at twenty years—the best out of the pack. This is the equivalent of elevating a Pee Wee league or High School sports coach to the big leagues: it is simply not done for some exceptionally good reasons that I won’t belabor.”
Adding “intelligence” to the CV of a State Department career bureaucrat is like adding “leadership” to the CV of a military officer who never quite had any significant command time. The State intel arm is INR. At last count they were the most experienced team in the IC averaging 23 years on accounts. Lukas was never part of INR. But neither was John Negroponte…
We’ve had an often odd-couple mix at the helm of the ODNI which resulted from misguided selection criteria-like politics, glass ceilings, precedent setting woke or gender ideology, and the need to have friendly forces in position-often politicians or seniors from the CIA-to reinforce and feed administration “spin:” criteria that often frankly ignored the ODNI mission and criticality of the job.
In the short history of the ODNI we’ve now established a trend where these positions are being filled with politicians and bureaucrats that lack intel chops and IC relationships and the experience that is necessary to both lead and drive the IC to achieve greater mission results.
It frankly-and sadly-defies belief or experience that DNI Gabbard and nominated PDDNI Lukas have the breadth of experience, nor- more importantly-the intel chops-necessary to undertake and conduct the activity necessary to bring change to the IC.
Change is easy to talk about and makes for great bumper stickers. Faux change takes a long time to talk about as well, with a lot of manhours and PowerPoint, but often at the end of the government day it all goes for nought.
Why is that? In previous articles I’ve written about the pace of play at these senior level positions where the elephants graze, including heads of agencies, cabinet positions, directors, etc. The calendar is typically booked out solid for at least 3 months and more likely six-nine months from the standpoint of obligations, travel and institutional commitments such as commercial partnership engagements, foreign liaisons, enduring education and training activities, chamber of commerce type events, professional associations, etc., etc., etc., ad nauseum.
The DNI and PDDNI will have a work week in excess of 100 hours with no defined start or stop time, chock full of events by the time the daily PDB cycle starts in earnest at 0300 each Monday to start another week on watch. The PDB team dedicated to this process will swap out every six months or so because of the pace of action: it is daunting, unrelenting, pressure packed and regular like the tides.
Leaders must delegate to the trustworthy-or the closest they have to it-else get swamped and put through the wringer with burn out as soon as a year.
The budget process itself is never ending, a continuous cycle of “sausage making” necessary to lubricate the IC with the sustenance that powers programs and keeps the trains running.
The program-acquisition process is similarly a never-ending hodge-podge of meetings, milestones, deadlines and activity that must be constantly attended to and serviced.
Oversight must be serviced-attended to-answered-placated…There are always myriad activities ongoing, many if not most of which have the capacity or capability to flare up into firefighting mode that distracts senior management and leadership levels, particularly when they involve bosses-whether POTUS level, Cabinet, congress, budget, legal, or other.
All who have the capability to disrupt any carefully laid plans, schedules and events at the drop of a hat.
Then there is the entirety of the IC to deal with. One of the distinct differences between the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the ODNI structure is that the DCI stayed relatively above the proverbial fray represented by the interactions with the largely non-contributors to the most important mission-keeping the number 1 customer POTUS happy, represented by the PDB activity.
The Community Management Staff (CMS) of some 300-450 personnel-who managed the IC budget and budget/program submission (National Intelligence Program Congressional Budget Justification, Congressional Budget Justification Books), IC big study efforts and programmatics-and the PDB staff itself might do coordination to work input, but as late as my last involvement the CIA was still producing some 80% or more of the PDB content (in the book.)
But the backup muscle to CMS in a pinch was the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, which could jump in at a moment’s notice to coordinate and staff emerging issues.
What ODNI did at standup-which is how they justified needing four times the CMS Staff or 1500 personnel that has now grown to 2000 personnel, was basically replicate and staff another level of IC expertise-initially with duty bodies from IC elements but often with entirely new personnel or using the “allure” of joint duty assignments to “procure” expertise from the larger community IC, including domain subject matter experts that were expected to “lead issue coordination” for ODNI across the IC.
I would point to this aspect of the ODNI and the resultant challenges in IC coordination that have been most responsible for the ODNI/IC failures since standup. Talent was spread too thin, analysts were incentivized to be managers to get promoted, the pipeline growing these analysts was permanently changed/disrupted, ODNI policies disincentivized deep agency expertise, training and proficiency testing has languished in favor of “whole person” type training (all a different story for another day.)
The ODNI would do well to consider returning to the somewhat caretaker staff construct that CMS performed for the DCI. Where the IC program was built through representatives of each of the IC elements detailed to CMS to pull things together to mate up with the larger IC efforts.
Make no mistake, CMS pulled together the IC Program for the DCI. And it is not something that can go away under the ODNI. What I am suggesting is that creating a whole nother level within the ODNI was not efficient, effective, nor a good use of personnel nor even a better process.
Having the program-procurement-acquisition functions at the ODNI has also resulted in considerable “monkey business” where projects that were not approved by the ODNI for funding have been funded at the expense of approved programs. Making a mockery of the often touted as sacrosanct acquisition process. To the tune of some tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars undermining the procurement process.
One of the most difficult challenges in professional life-particularly in the government-is leading change. The trains must keep running-the mission can’t stop-programs march on through bureaucratic momentum-the work force is steeped in a culture that rewards the status quo-incentives like promotions and rewards base off established routines that people have grown up in, worked through, are in the midst of doing.
There is an expectation associated with it/them (routines)-success is defined by it. Leaders have mastered it and are in their comfort zone working through it. Being a change agent to such an activity is disturbingly disruptive to the very leaders necessary to make it successful.
Change demands a vision-conceptual development-articulation of new concepts-embracing often radical and disruptive technologies-new organizational constructs-revamping organizational information exchange expectations and demands or dependencies, timelines and flows-the implementing of new routines, changes to the heretofore pace of play, new demands that require new and different skills, knowledge and ability on the part of the workforce, etc., etc.
There must be deliberate, dogmatic, unrelenting and exquisite communications fostering a ruthless desire to embrace what will most likely be viewed as disruptive, confrontational, new policy and procedures that many will view as disturbing and threatening.
Which-of course-it will be, as is the nature of change. I know of three or four or a half dozen exemplars of change that serve as a caution to any undertaking such as I believe the ODNI must undergo. None of which I believe bodes well for success given how much work I personally think it is going to take for the ODNI to “get there from here.”
Most government somewhat “radical changes” require an unambiguous mission statement from leadership and a designated lead change agent unquestionably empowered by the “boss” who won’t take no for an answer from the borg.
Who is given the authority to designate and identify dedicated resources that-and this is the hardest part-buy in to an altruistic, selfless service, unincentivized mission role to get the job done.
A worst practice is when the boss allows or volunteers “status-quo doobies” to help who often turn into giant pebble in the shoe antagonistic disrupters working to maintain the prevailing state of affairs.
What is required is what we see unfolding with DOGE. Given that the mission starts with the ODNI, but entails the entire IC, the magnitude of the task cannot be overstated.
I’m not optimistic that it’s going to happen. I would settle for an ODNI/IC or outsider led commission or task force inquiry to do a causality and lessons learned effort or a deep dive into a handful of IC failures since ODNI standup: starting with 7 October 2023.
Even just doing this one, or maybe the Afghanistan withdrawal and Ukraine would provide enough insights to make some major changes.
I’m not going to hold my breath…
Max Dribbler
10 April 2025
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