China, Part IV: The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Digital Silk Road, and Arctic Silk Road Initiatives

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Part III of this series discussed Xi Jinping’s signature economic initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and one of the four component initiatives, the Silk Road Economic Belt. From Part III:

The BRI goal is to develop a global infrastructure controlled by Communist China. The infrastructure elements are largely focused on the development of transportation assets that can later be exploited by Beijing to transport the resources and raw materials needed to fuel Chinese manufacturing concerns, as well as support the exportation of finished Chinese goods to overseas markets around the world, including roads, ports, railroads, bridges, etc. BRI investments also include renewable energy projects, communications infrastructures, and cultural exchanges.

Part III discussed the overland element of the BRI. This part of the series covers the other three component initiatives: 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Digital Silk Road, and Arctic Silk Road.

21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). This initiative is the maritime portion of the BRI that focuses on the development and modernization of ports and related infrastructure in various countries with which Communist China engages in commerce via the sea. Raw materials and natural resources needed to fuel Chinese industry flow from Chinese-built overseas ports to Chinese ports, with finished goods being transported to overseas markets in China’s burgeoning export economy.

A report in the Center for Strategic and International Studies states that the MSR is a “development strategy to boost infrastructure connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa.” The key trade routes forming the backbone of the MSR are:

  • China – Southeast Asia
  • China – South Asia
  • China – Middle East and East Africa
  • China – Europe
  • China – Latin America

Some of the key Chinese ports anchoring those trade routes as the “eastern end of the MSR” include the following:

Shanghai. This is China’s most important seaport, which is the largest in the world, handling an average of 2,000 ships per month.

Shenzen. The second most important Chinese seaport, it is the third largest in the world. Over 40 shipping companies are located there which manage over 130 container routes with overseas trade partners.

Hong Kong. The deep water port has been a hub of the container shipping industry for years with its nine container terminals.

Ningbo. This is a major port in China’s southeast Zhejiang Province serving as a major container and cargo-handling port. Ningbo services China’s “Golden Triangle” and the lower part of the Yangtze River economic development area. It is a major importer of “raw materials, cargos, and finished products from North America, South America, and Oceania.”

Guangzhou. This port that has been in constant operation for over 2,000 years and is now heavily involved in import-export of “coal, oil, grain, fertilizers, steel, cars, and ores:”

[T]he port has direct shipping lines to Europe, North America, Australia, the Red Sea, and Southeast Asia. It has formed the specialized waterway transportation system for container, coal, petrochemical, RO-RO vehicle and grain. Its cargo handling capacity expanded to 590 million tons in 2017, ranking the fifth in the world while its container handling capacity expanded to 20 million containers, ranking the seventh in the world.

Quanzhour. In the thirteenth century, Quanzhou was the largest port in the world and a key entry point into mainland China. Once the key Chinese port for exports of black tea and camphor, Quanzhour continues to be a key port for exporting agricultural products like rice and tea.

Others. Other key Chinese ports include Qingdao (coal, mineral oil, iron ore, and grain), Tianjin (the largest manmade port in China), Dalian (mineral oil, coal, grain, and refined oils), and Xiamen (cement, chemical fertilizers, sugar, wheat or coal).

Key overseas ports involved in ChiCom investments (exploitation?) related to the Maritime Silk Road were focused initially on facilitating trade with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and later countries in South Asia and East Africa associated with the Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Middle East/East Africa trade MSR trade routes. The key strategic goal was maintaining Chinese control of these facilities for decades through long-term leases by which the countries would pay back the ChiCom infrastructure investments:

Between 2015 and 2017, China has leased ownership over the following ports:

    • Gwadar, Pakistan: 40 years [expanded to Qasim Port near Karachi]
    • Kyaukpyu, Myanmar: 50 years
    • Kuantan, Malaysia: 60 years
    • Obock, Djibouti: 10 years
    • Malacca Gateway: 99 Years
    • Hambantota, Sri Lanka: 99 years
    • Muara, Brunei: 60 years
    • Feydhoo Finolhu, Maldives: 50 years

Europe is the end destination for China’s BRI, so it is imperative to understand the developments that are taking its southern branch, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), from concept to reality. The European Union has been watching the expansion of Communist China’s maritime trade empire, seeking to capitalize on ChiCom overseas investment for several years. According to a study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the MSR “is constantly expanding its geographic scope to new waters, and is seeking to diversify and secure sea lines of communication as part of China’s maritime renaissance.” That expansion has included Chinese investments in a number of Mediterranean and East Atlantic seaports in Europe including:

And so on!

It is important to understand that the Maritime Silk Road is not a single route but is planned and being built in some cases as a web, or a network, of maritime routes throughout the world. The highway for Chinese container ships, if you will. Planning is even underway and some under construction through Panama and Nicaragua into the US “lake” – the Caribbean Sea.  A railroad from Port Sudan clear across Africa to Dakar, Senegal, will provide an anchor for a network to reap the natural resources that are relatively untapped throughout the African continent. A Mediterranean port might be in the offing in Algeria, too, linked with a rail net through the Sahel and Sahara.

And a sea route through the Russian Arctic is a planned possibility. Which brings us to a brief discussion of the Arctic Silk Road.

Arctic Silk Road. The Northern Sea Route through the Arctic Ocean is the shortest pathway between Asia and Europe, saving as much as 30% of the transit time from mainland China through the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal. As noted here, “there are three potential routes across the Arctic: the Northeast passage around Eurasia, the Northwest passage around North America and the Central Arctic ocean route.” China has openly expressed an interest in an Arctic Silk Road since a COSCO container ship first navigated the “northeast passage” in 2013, as reported here:

The Chinese government’s 14th Five-Year Plan confirmed Beijing’s interest in further developing the Arctic Silk Road as a component of the broader Belt and Road Initiative. As early as June 2017, the National Development and Reform Committee and the State Oceanographic Administration of China named the Arctic Silk Road as one of the Belt and Road Initiative areas.

As reported in a DoD annual report to Congress in 2020 entitled, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”:

In January 2018, China published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and self-declared China to be a “Near-Arctic State.” The strategy identifies China’s interests as access to natural resources, securing Arctic SLOCs, and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to its implementation. China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates one Ukrainian-built icebreaking research vessel, the Xuelong, which in 2017 completed its 8th Arctic expedition and became the first Chinese official vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage.

At least five nations (Russia, USA, Canada, Sweden, Norway) lay claim to the Arctic region, which contains large resource deposits of hydrocarbons, other minerals, and precious metals. Although there is general agreement of lines of demarcation in the region, disputes remain, including the establishment and control of sea trade routes. This is where the ChiComs come into play as they seek to repeat the successes of their “southern MSR strategy” in the Arctic region through strategic investments in port infrastructure. Here is a list of ongoing Chinese projects in the Arctic:

  • China–Russia Yamal liquified natural gas (LNG) project (the world’s largest LNG project with Russia and France as partners)
  • Payakha oilfield (on the Taymyr peninsula in the region of Krasnoyarsk)
  • Zarubino port (southwest of Vladivostok near the Chinese border)
  • Arkhangelsk deepwater port (Russia’s largest deepwater port on the Arctic Ocean; still in planning stages)
  • China–Finland Arctic Monitoring and Research Centre (to collect, process and share satellite data, providing an open international platform to support climate research, environmental monitoring and Arctic navigation)

That last project is intended to contribute to China’s Digital Silk Road initiative.

Digital Silk Road (DSR). The Digital Silk Road is the component of the BRI strategy that aims to provide the global communications connectivity in support of the overarching worldwide economic dominance goal of the Chinese Communist Party, as noted here:

The DSR aims to improve digital connectivity in participating countries, with China as the main driver of the process. On the macro level, the DSR is about the development and interoperability of critical digital infrastructure such as terrestrial and submarine data cables, 5G cellular networks, data storage centers, and global satellite navigation systems. In one of the most recent moves, China completed the launch of its global satellite system, BeiDou, which, in some regions, is more accurate than the United States’ global positioning system (GPS). In Asia, Pakistan, Laos, Brunei, and Thailand are among the countries that have adopted BeiDou, and there is growing use in West Asia (the Middle East) and Africa. At the micro level, the DSR promotes connectivity between local businesses and consumers and among businesses and consumers. Examples include e-commerce, taxi-hailing, fintech (financial technology), and edtech (education technology) platforms and apps, as well as hardware such as routers, smartphones, and PCs.

Control the standards underpinning these various evolving new technologies and capabilities is a primary objective of the DSR. The Chinese violate international standards all the time, e.g., for genetic engineering and telecommunications interoperability, and they don’t have a good track record in cooperating on international standards. The Chinese are also involved in technology-laundering operations through joint ventures with many overseas firms. They develop the technology in the joint venture, then steal it and duplicate it in a Chinese-owned company.

Winning the standards war is a key to controlling the technologies of the future. Stopping Huawei Technologies’ encroachment in the US was an important first step to prevent data and IP theft by the ChiComs, but the 5G fight is just one major part of the battle for control of standards. There are other battles involving security technologies, facial recognition, navigation system interoperability, competition, a human rights battle, a facial recognition battle, e-commerce standards, digital currency, etc., that must also be won in order to preserve free enterprise in the face of ChiCom mercantilism.

The long-term ChiCom goal is to win the standards battle and force other nations and multinational corporations to use Chinese technology as the information backbone of the world, thereby stifling competition and controlling the digitization marketplace of the future. This is a direct threat to the current international standards regimen that has been evolved since World War II.

This ends Part IV of the China series. The next part will discuss the Made in China 2025 initiative, which seeks to improve its technological competitiveness with the rest of the world in artificial intelligence, telecommunications, electric vehicles, green energy, and other evolving advanced technologies.

The end.

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