Too Many Generals- Part II of Five Parts

The three words I hated to hear from any general officer was, “I love history.” This didn’t mean that he studied, valued, or even understood history. Rather, he was a “history fanboy.” A fanboy loves to dabble in history and jump into the business of the historian. Of course, they jump into everyone else’s business as well, an egregious behavior condemned by British General JFC Fuller in his famous treatise, Generalship: It’s Diseases and Their Cures.[1]

And this brings me to what I believe are the three most destructive consequences of the bloat of general officers in the U.S. Army. This article will deal with the first- they micromanage down, and rare is the senior officer who does not do this.

Micromanagement is more than just a lack of trust in subordinates. It’s a symptom of a dearth of commonality in worldview. Those who hold a common worldview may often disagree on details, but hold to higher philosophical ideas and concepts. In military terms, this was called “understanding a commander’s intent” for a given operation. A lack of common worldview militates against this understanding, and leaders, at all levels, will feel compelled to micromanage subordinates. This becomes more pervasive in a “zero defect” Army, where any mistake is blown out of proportion to the detriment of one’s career.

Since there are so many general officers, they are almost falling over themselves looking for something to do. As a consequence, they get into the nitty-gritty of staff work. Take for example the problems of today’s United States Army Europe (USAREUR). Until just recently, USAREUR had been reduced to what amounted to only two combat brigades, along with various support units. It could have easily been commanded by a 1-star, or perhaps 2-star general, but instead was a 3-star billet.[2] Naturally, there were plenty of 1- and 2-star billets below that 3-star, not to mention a host of colonels and lieutenant-colonels.

A staff officer in the Operations Section of USAREUR, what we call the G-3, told me, “we don’t do staff work here. Rather, the Commanding General (i.e. the 3-star) reaches down into the staff when he wants something done, and puts together his own project team.” Obviously, the 3-star clearly didn’t have enough to do.[3]

When I was at Forces Command (FORSCOM), which is a 4-star billet, I once had to put together a briefing packet for the general. I staffed it up to a full colonel, who then sent it back with suggested changes. I made the changes and pushed it back. He again sent it to me with more changes. This went on for five rounds, consuming an entire afternoon. When he started making changes to his previous changes, I said “enough.” I held the packet until the precise time it was due and pushed it back up, figuring he wouldn’t have the time to meddle with it further. The packet went through with no issues. What made this exchange so frustrating was that he had just previously agreed with me that there was far too much micromanagement in the Army. Self-awareness is not one of the strengths of many of these senior officers.

Because of this micromanagement, staff officers respond by learning how to manipulate their generals. I even once heard the Chief of Staff of USAREUR (a German Bundeswehr 1-star) tell the staff officers that they needed to give the 3-star commander only the details he needed to hear so they can get him to approve their own plans. To give the commander the information he needed to make an informed decision was obviously not on the table. And when they can’t manipulate their commander, the junior officers become consummate bootlickers, acquiescing to any idea, no matter how inane, that the general puts forward. Even worse, lower ranked generals do the same with their superiors. While micromanaging down, they toady up, nodding their heads in passive approval to anything suggested.

The ghosts of Keitel and Jodl, infamous “yes men” on Hitler’s staff during World War II, are very strong within U.S. Army commands.

Russ Rodgers has several books published on Amazon.

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[1] JFC Fuller, Generalship, It’s Diseases and Their Cures. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co, 1936, pp 32, 90.

[2] Recently, USAREUR and AFRICOM was merged as a single 4-star billet, US Army Europe and Africa. And now that it is a 4-star command, one can image how many 3, 2 and 1-stars are embedded within that command.

[3] This same 3-star, when he took command of USAREUR and had finished briefing the staff on his “likes and dislikes,” stopped at the door as he was leaving the conference room and said, “my wife and I are separated.” The staff inwardly moaned… this meant he had time on his hands to get into their business.