The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) just conducted a multi-day coordinated “exercise” in six locations that effectively surrounded Taiwan, which Beijing claimed was in response to US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s brief visit to Taipei on 2 August.
The below is expert analysis of the PLA’s exercises from a retired Navy intelligence officer who was a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii.
Overview: The size, geographic expanse and complexity of the exercise reflected months of planning although some events, such as expanded aircraft participation and PLA ground force participation probably were recent add-ons. The PRC’s 04-07 Exercise had two purposes; 1) intimidate Taiwan and warn the Japan and the US against assisting Taiwan in a conflict, and 2) practice elements of China’s war plan for a Sino-Taiwan Conflict. As such, it marked the largest PLA air-missile-maritime exercise ever conducted and included:
- Operations in six closure areas that encircled Taiwan
- The largest single-day aircraft and warship operations in the Taiwan Strait since the 1950s (68 aircraft on 06 August and 14 warships versus 59 aircraft and no warships in October, 2021). At least 19 and 20 aircraft crossed the meridian line on 05 and 06 August, respectively.
- Eleven ballistic missile launches from 3 separate Strategic Rocket Force Brigades, three of which passed over Taiwan, and two impacted within Japan’s Economic Exclusion Zone just 80km from Japan’s southernmost islands. The missile shots forced aircraft and shipping to cancel flights and choose alternate ports, respectively.
- The PLA Navy (PLAN) practiced blockade and both land-attack and anti-ship targeting in cooperation with PLA Naval Aircraft (PLANAF).
- Battalion-sized amphibious operations on the PRC coast opposite Taiwan.
- Extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles – against Taiwan’s offshore islands and penetrating the northwest and southweast corners of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
- Cyber attacks on Taiwan government sites, including the Ministry of Defense.
Assessment: The exercise provided some insights into China’s potential courses of action and preferences in a Sino-Taiwan conflict. It suggests Beijing would first isolate Taiwan and resort to air and missile strikes in hopes of breaking Taipei’s political will. A costly invasion probably is a last resort.
Key Takeaways for the Future: The exercise demonstrated that blockade in a conflict need not require a constant naval presence offshore, but rather, shipping and air traffic can be deterred by air and missile threats in support of a maritime blockade. It also reflected the PLA’s improving capacity for joint operations. The PLA Strategic Rocket Force (PLASRF) launches required coordination among the theater headquarters, PLAN, PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and PLASRF staffs, as well as with the PLA Ground Force Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) firings into a maritime area that also necessitated some coordination with naval and Coast Guard authorities to ensure safety of local aircraft and offshore shipping. These are incremental steps, but they represent an enduring commitment to mastering joint operations.
Firsts: The exercise included six firsts:
- Theater Command directing a blockade of Taiwan
- PLASRF missile launches into Japan’s EEZ (80km from Hateruma, Japan’s southernmost inhabited island)
- Public admission of a nuclear attack submarine operating in support of a carrier task group [that of the Shandong (CV-17)]
- PLA Ground Force MLRS firing into a maritime closure area.
- Public inclusion of a mobile hospital capable of handling mass casualties
- PAP Coast Guard units operating along the periphery of the exercise area in the East China Sea. It is uncertain if they were participants but the Eastern Theater Command Fleet had to be made aware of their presence and activities, for safety.
What Was Missing: The PLA Air Force did not fly any J-20s or Russian-built Su-35s in the exercise. This probably was deliberate – to deny Taiwan and Western intelligence agencies a close look at those aircraft.
Why Now: President Xi has become increasingly concerned about Japan and the US moving closer to Taiwan and the former’s increasing defense spending. PRC leaders’ rhetoric and PLA air and naval incursions have been escalating since 2021. Moreover, Speaker Pelosi’s visit highlighted two things that particularly concern PRC leader Xi; 1) her ability and willingness to conduct a foreign visit on her own authority, which no member of China’s National People’s Congress can even contemplate, and 2) the fact she leads the democratically-elected branch that originates America’s government funding and economic policies. Her position and role make her commitment to Taiwan’s security particularly significant. Unable to bully her, Xi had to demonstrate China’s power, diplomatic, economic and military.
Final Comments: This exercise marks the latest escalation in China’s expanding military exercise and Taiwan-intimidation campaign. The bulk of the naval and air activities and at least two of the missile launches were planned well in advance of these exercises. However, planning the expansion probably began in April when news of Pelosi’s trip first surfaced. Adding aircraft to an exercise event is comparatively simple, as is the addition of a ground force firing into an offshore live-fire area. Increasing the missile unit participation and launches was more challenging. The diplomatic and economic actions that accompanied the exercise were decided as a contingency in the May-July period and probably are related entirely to Speaker Pelosi’s visit. The goal was and continues to be the intimidation of Taiwan via the application of all elements of PRC power.
Captain Carl O. Schuster retired from the US Navy on 01 June 1999 after serving on a variety of US and international naval units and staffs. He is a freelance writer of military history and adjunct faculty teaching in Hawaii Pacific University’s Diplomacy and Military Science Program
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